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Introduction
optimal strategy to defend network infrastructure
no standard for benchmarking
current state of strategy evaluation:
veriﬁcation of the strategy’s decision logicevaluation in a simulated environment
simulated attacksreplayed attacks
evaluation in a real environment, in-house attacks
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Research Questions
1. What are the differences between defence strategy evaluation insimulated and real environments?
2. Does the attacker change his behaviour based on the defender’sactions?
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Experiment Setup I
Semi-real Run
during the experiment, the strategy was set to defend a networkof honeypots in Masaryk University network
Simulation Run
attacks observed on the network of honeypots before theexperiment were replayed against the strategy
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Experiment Setup II
Honeynet Topology
central logging mechanisms and a database of authenticationattemptsgate that had the capability to manipulate the traﬃcexperiment setup described in demo session
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Experiment Setup III
Defence Requirements
the service should not be compromised (attack success penalty),
the service should be available (unavailability penalty),
the ﬁrewall should not be reconﬁgured frequently(reconﬁguration penalty).
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Tested Strategies I
Game Theory Based Strategy
both the attacker’s and defender’s goals
Nash equilibria to ﬁnd the optimal defender’s strategy
ﬁnite, non-zero, two player game in an extensive form
Cost Sensitive Strategy
considers the immediate defender’s cost associated with action
action cost consists of
negative impacts: cost of reconﬁguration, cost of unavailabilitypositive impacts: potential damage that was mitigated by thedefensive action
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Collected Data
experiment:
644 attacks,July and August 2016
historical data:
15,214 attacks,December 2011 till June 2016
Strategy Game theory Cost sensitive# attacks 207 437# reconﬁgurations 2,374 1,029# minutes blocked 5,294 22,467# successful attacks 55 62
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Simulated and Semi-real Execution
There is a statistically signiﬁcant difference between the evaluationresults in a simulated environment and a semi-real environment.
Environment Strategy Mean strategy score Stdev
Semi-real Game-theory 803 1,279Cost sensitive 489 938
Simulated Game-theory 1,006 2,371Cost sensitive 1,109 2,343
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Attacker’s Behaviour
Attack Length
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Attacker’s Behaviour
Correlation Between Attack Length and Strategy Result
Environment Strategy Correlation 95% CI
Semi-real Game-theory 0.11 [-0.02, 0.25]Cost sensitive 0.06 [-0.03, 0.15]
Simulated Game-theory 0.35 [0.33, 0.36]Cost sensitive 0.41 [0.39, 0.42]
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Attacker’s Behaviour
Return Rate
Cost sensitive Game theory None
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Attacker’s Behaviour
Summary
The attackers reacted to the defence as follows:
the attacks had longer duration
they returned more often to continue in the attack
the strategy result is less dependent on the length of the attack
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Conclusion I
Lessons Learned
the formal deﬁnition of requirements is not suﬃcient
computational complexity of the strategies is often not reﬂectedin the evaluation and have to be considered
deployment in a real environment forces to address all aspectsof the strategy
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Conclusion II
Summary
the most common evaluation is executed in simulatedenvironment using replayed or simulated attacks
we show that the evaluation using replayed attacks is notsuﬃcient, since the attackers change in behaviour affects theevaluation results
we found several changes in attacker behaviour due to thenetwork defence
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Conclusion III
Future Work
we need a better, standardized methods for evaluation toenable objective comparison
the evaluation should begin with simple, easily setup scenariosand continue to more realistic scenarios
at least some of the evaluations should face real attackers
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